Showing posts with label amicus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label amicus. Show all posts
Thursday, February 23, 2017
Myriad Genetics Files Amicus Briefs in Joint Infringement Cases Akamai and McKesson
Myriad Genetics Files Amicus Briefs in Joint Infringement Cases Akamai and McKesson
Personalized medicine company Myriad Genetics has filed amicus briefs in Akamai and McKesson, two cases currently pending before the en banc Federal Circuit that address the doctrine of joint infringement (aka divided infringement). These cases have been the subject of much discussion elsewhere, see for example the Patently-O and Patent Docs blogs. In a nutshell, the Federal Circuit seeks to delineate the circumstances under which a party will be held liable for patent infringement when multiple parties perform all steps of the patented method in concert, but no single party performs all of the steps.
In its amicus briefs, which are largely redundant, Myriad points out that while the recent joint infringement cases coming out of the Federal Circuit have tended to involve claims directed towards business methods and software, the decisions have created case law with substantial negative implications for patents on diagnostics and personalized medicine. Molecular diagnostics generally involve the discovery of a correlation between a molecular marker (e.g., a genetic variation, or the level of a metabolite) and a clinically relevant indication (e.g., whether an individual has a predisposition to a disease such as cancer, or would be likely to benefit from a particular drug or course of therapeutic treatment). Patent protection for these discoveries is generally achieved by means of a method claim reciting two steps-(1) detecting the molecular marker in a patient, and (2) recognizing the correlation. As noted in the Myriad briefs, product claims on the molecular markers themselves (e.g., isolated DNA molecules or proteins), and methods of testing for them, are generally precluded in the post-Human Genome Project era by prior art (not to mention efforts by the ACLU and others to render such products unpatentable).
The problem from the perspective of a molecular diagnostic innovator company such as Myriad is that the Federal Circuits recent joint infringement decisions would seem to dictate that such a method claim would not be infringed under circumstances where one party (e.g., a diagnostic testing laboratory) performs the first step and an independent second party (e.g., a doctor) performs the second. Under recent Federal Circuit case law, assuming that the parties are not in an agency relationship, it seems likely that in most instances no party would be found infringing, and the patent owner would be left without a remedy, even in the face of substantial infringement in competition with its business.
In its briefs, Myriad notes that the Federal Circuit has repeatedly admonished patent owners that problems of divided infringement could have been avoided if the claims have been better drafted, i.e., in a manner such that a single party performs all of the steps of a method claim. However, Myriad argues (correctly I think) that the patent eligibility doctrine effectively forecloses this course of action. The Federal Circuits recent decision in Prometheus (discussed previously on this blogs), in particular, interprets Bilski as rendering patent ineligible a claim reciting nothing more than the mere recognition of a correlation per se (which the court equates with patenting a mental step). In order to be patent eligible, Prometheus seems to require a diagnostic method claim to explicitly recite a transformative step, such as detecting the marker, or treating a patient. This creates a Catch-22 for the diagnostic inventor. The discovery of the correlation is the core of the invention, providing substantial therapeutic benefits to patients, but under Prometheus and Bilksi a claim to the correlation must also include an additional step which will often render the claim highly susceptible to circumvention by two parties separately performing the steps.
To avoid this problem, Myriad proposes the following as an appropriate test for infringement of method claims by multiple parties:
When a first party performing one or more steps of a method claim actively causes another party to perform the other steps of the same method claim, or when two parties act in a concerted manner to perform all steps of a method claim, then the first party and the parties acting in concert should each be deemed a direct infringer.
Available link for download
Thursday, February 16, 2017
My Amicus Brief in Bowman v Monsanto
My Amicus Brief in Bowman v Monsanto
Over the last several days, I have posted a number of briefs that have been filed by various parties in Bowman v. Monsanto. Today I filed my own Amicusbrief in the case, in support of affirmance, available here.
Here is my "Summary of Argument":
Intellectual property plays a critical role in the development of self-replicating technologies such as Monsantos genetically modified soybeans. Without some mechanism to constrain the use and dissemination of replica products, free riders would quickly flood the market with copies and impair the innovators ability to secure an adequate return on investment. Because of the ease with which genetically modified soybeans can be replicated by any user who comes into possession of even a single seed, whatever the source, enforceable patent protection is essential to maintain an adequate incentive for innovation.
The potential impact of this case goes well beyond Monsanto and soybeans. A decision that results in the exhaustion of patent rights in copies of self-replicating products could dramatically undermine investment in a host of promising green technologies for sustainably feeding, fueling and healing the world. It might also discourage commercialization of synthetic biology, the much heralded next iteration of the biotechnology revolution. Such a dramatic and far-reaching shift in the patent landscape is certainly not warranted, particularly on the facts of this case.
It is important to recognize that it is petitioner, not the Federal Circuit, who is seeking to create an exception to the doctrine of patent exhaustion. In essence, petitioner is arguing for an expansion of the doctrine to encompass not only patented products that have been the subject of an authorized sale, but also copies of the product - copies that were never the subject of an authorized sale. Petitioner alleges that this drastic measure is warranted because the use of Monsantos product inherently and unavoidably results in the production of copies, citing numerous hypothetical policy concerns. But these potential concerns are not presented in this case, involving a farmer who intentionally used and benefitted from Monsantos patented technology without paying for it. To the extent any of these concerns actually become an issue in the real world, they can and should be addressed in a manner that does not effectively deprive innovators of the ability to enforce their patents with respect to self-replicating technologies.
It is informative to consider how analogous concerns have been addressed with respect to another important self-replicating technology, computer software. Even though the use of many software programs inherently and unavoidably results in the production of a copy on the users computer, which would technically constitute copyright infringement, it makes little sense for software companies to sue their customers for this sort of infringement. It is simply not a problem. If the potential for an infringement lawsuit became a concern, the software company could address it by explicitly authorizing purchasers to make a copy of the software, at least to the extent that such copying is an essential step in using the software. In any event, to resolve any lingering concern, Congress took the step of amending the copyright statute to explicitly exempt authorized users of computer software from liability for producing a copy that is used solely as a necessary element of running the software.
Significantly, it has not been deemed necessary to expand copyrights first sale doctrine (copyrights analog to the doctrine of patent exhaustion) in a manner that exhausts patent rights in copies of copyrighted software that are inherently created when the software is used. To do so would effectively strip software developers of meaningful copyright protection once a first round of copies has been sold and replicated. In the same way, and for much the same reasons, it is unnecessary to expand the doctrine of patent exhaustion with respect to self-replicating patented technologies like Monsantos seeds. To the contrary, to do so would effectively deny enforceable patent protection to many self-replicating technologies.
Congress is in the position to weigh competing interests, and if necessary enact legislation to address any unique policy concerns presented by the interplay of intellectual property rights and self-replicating technologies. It has done so with respect to computer software, and in a manner that does not deprive software producers of the ability to enforce their copyrights against free riders. It can do so with respect to patented self-replicating technologies as well. In fact, a bill is currently pending in Congress that would effectively create a compulsory license in patented seeds. Leaving aside the question of whether this would be the best approach, it illustrates that Congress is fully capable of addressing concerns expressed by petitioner and its amici without entirely stripping innovators like Monsanto of their patent rights.
Available link for download
Wednesday, February 15, 2017
My Amicus Brief Has Been Filed in Ariad v Lilly
My Amicus Brief Has Been Filed in Ariad v Lilly
I have filed an amicus brief in Ariad v. Lilly in support of neither party but arguing against the Lilly Written Description Requirement (LWD), available here.
My brief essentially argues that LWD has been applied by the courts and PTO in an arbitrary and inconsistent manner that lacks any rational basis in law, science, or policy, and in a manner that can effectively preclude some biotechnological inventors from obtaining adequate patent protection for their inventions, particularly inventions relating to proteins and DNA. My arguments dovetail in large part with those made by Novozymes in the brief they filed a couple days ago.
My colleagues Mark Janis (Indiana University) and Tim Holbrook (Emory University) have filed their own amici brief, arguing that there is no independent written description requirement, and that enablement is the proper and only doctrinal tool for policing claim scope and for determining whether a disclosure supports later added claims.
Available link for download
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