Showing posts with label court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label court. Show all posts

Monday, March 6, 2017

Monsanto v Bowman A Unanimous Supreme Court Sides with Monsanto

Monsanto v Bowman A Unanimous Supreme Court Sides with Monsanto


 

 

Today a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuits decision in Monsanto v. Bowman, and held that "patent exhaustion does not permit a farmer to reproduce patented seeds for planting and harvesting without the patent holders permission." A background on the case can be found in earlier posts to this blog.

The Justices seemed to see through Bowmans arguments and understand what was at stake in this case. Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan noted that it is "well-settled" that the authorized purchaser of a patented product does not acquire any right to make copies of the product, and observed that were the Court to find in favor of Bowman patents would provide "scant benefit" to companies like Monsanto, and little incentive for investment in innovation.

The Court’s decision is explicitly premised on the fact that Monsanto requires farmers to enter into a license agreement which allows them to plant the patented seeds and harvest the resulting crop for use as food or animal feed, but not to replant the seeds or sell them for replanting. In footnote 3, the Court points out that "we do not here confront a case in which Monsanto (or an affiliated seed company) sold Roundup Ready to a farmer without an express license agreement. For reasons we explain below, we think that case unlikely to arise. And in the event it did, the farmer might reasonably claim that the sale came within an implied license to plant and harvest one soybean crop."

Kagan pointed out that a decision in favor of Bowman would be entirely inconsistent with the Court’s 2001 decision in J.E.M Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, in which the Court held that utility patent protection is available for seeds and plants. In J.E.M., the Court noted that that the requirements for getting a patent are more stringent than those for obtaining a Plant Variety Protection (PVP) certificate, and that the protections afforded by a patent are correspondingly greater.  If the Court had sided with Bowman, it would mean that the owner of a patent would not only not be able to prevent a buyer from saving and replanting harvested seeds, but would be unable to prevent the buyer from selling the seeds, something "even a PVP certificate owner (who, recall, is supposed to have fewer rights) can usually accomplish."

Some supporters of Bowman have argued that farmers have a long-standing tradition of buying commodity grain for planting, but the Court gave short shrift to this contention. In a footnote, the Court observed that grain elevators "purchase grain from farmers and sell it for consumption; under federal and state law, they generally cannot package or market their grain for use as agricultural seed." The Court also noted that the commodity soybeans Bowman purchased were not intended for planting, but for consumption, and that Bowman himself had "conceded in deposition testimony that he knew of no other farmer who employed beans bought from a grain elevator to grow a new crop."

The Court also rejected Bowmans argument that seeds should be treated differently for purposes of exhaustion because they "self-replicate." The Court observed that Bowman was far from a passive observer, and that he had actively "made" (in the infringing sense) the copied seeds by purchasing the seeds knowing that many would be Roundup Ready, applying glyphosate in a way that culled any plants without the patented trait, saving the seeds to plant a later time, planting the beans in his field at the time he thought best, attending and treating them, including by exploiting their patented glyphosate-resistance, and harvesting the seeds, which he either marketed or saved to begin the next cycle. "In all this, the bean surely figure. But it was Bowman, and not the bean, who controlled the reproduction (unto the eighth generation) of Monsantos patented invention.”

In the final paragraph, Kagan emphasizes that the decision is limited to the facts on hand, and the holding does not extend to hypothetical situations in which an article self-replicates "outside the purchaser’s control," or in which replication might be a necessary or incidental step in using the item for another purpose. She cites to 17 USC  117, a section of the copyright statute that addresses concerns relating to software and copyright that are very analogous to the concerns about inadvertent infringement expressed by supporters of Bowman. This analogy between software copyright and DNA patent was the theme of the Amicus brief I filed in support of Monsanto, in which I particularly pointed out that concerns about unavoidable infringement could be addressed by Congress if necessary, and citing 17 USC 117 as a specific example of that approach.

 

 

Available link for download

Read more »

Friday, February 17, 2017

Monsanto v Cefetra EU Court of Justice Limits Scope of Patent Protection Available to Gene Sequences

Monsanto v Cefetra EU Court of Justice Limits Scope of Patent Protection Available to Gene Sequences


A couple of years ago I posted an article (available here) discussing the case of Monsanto v. Cefetra. Essentially, in that case a European court held that Monsanto patents claiming the gene responsible for its Roundup Ready trait were not infringed by the importation of soy meal containing the gene, because the grinding of the soybeans to make the meal rendered the DNA incapable of expressing the encoded protein, and thus unprotectable pursuant to the 1998 European Union Directive on biotechnology.

On Tuesday, July 6, that decision was affirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This is the highest judicial body of the European Union, so there will be no further appeals, and this would appear to be the final word on the subject. The decision was reported in an article posted on IPKat, a respected European IP blog, available here. I am no expert on European law, but here are a few thoughts on the significance of this case.

First, my interpretation of the decision.

In a nutshell, the Court of Justice held that although the so-called Biotech Directive, promulgated by the European Union in 1998, permits the patenting of naturally occurring DNA sequences, the scope of patent protection only extends to products incorporating the DNA if the DNA is capable of performing “the function for which it was patented." Applying this criterion to the facts of the case, the Court held that the patentable function of the gene at issue was to confer glyphosate (i.e., RoundUp) resistance upon a plant, and that since the soy meal is dead and thus incapable of expressing this function, the DNA residing in the soy meal is ineligible for patent protection.

The Court went on to hold that the Biotech Directive supersedes national law, and precludes individual European nations from enacting legislation that would permit patenting of DNA sequence per se. It also held that the prohibition against patenting DNA sequences per se applies retroactively to patents predating the EU’s adoption of Directive in 1998. In short, this unappealable ruling appears to be binding upon all 27 European Union Member States, and all DNA patents, no matter when they were issued.

The ruling could have a substantial impact on biotechnology. Obviously, it provides an opening for growers to circumvent gene patents used to protect genetically modified crops by growing the crops in a country where the gene is not patented, such as Argentina in this case, or in a jurisdiction with weak patent enforcement, and then importing the product into a European Union member wherein the patent is in force with impunity.

According to the logic of the decision, if viable seeds were imported, they would likely be found infringing because the DNA would still be capable of performing the function for which it was patented. But if the product has been processed, and as a result no longer viable, as exemplified by the soy meal at issue in this case, importation should not be found to constitute infringement.

The ruling could also have implications for the scope of protection afforded by gene patents for genetic diagnostic testing. Genetic diagnostic testing, such as by DNA sequencing, typically involves the isolation and/or amplification of the gene sequence being tested. This isolation and amplification might be characterized as the manufacture of the DNA, which could constitute infringement of a patent claiming the DNA sequence. For example, the ACLU challenge to Myriad’s BRCA gene patents is based in part on an assumption that the patent claims reciting isolated BRCA sequences would be infringed by unauthorized testing for mutations in the BRCA genes (which typically involves DNA sequencing).

However, this assumption is premised on the patents covering the isolated DNA sequences per se. But arguably, the isolated and amplified DNA fragments generated in the course of DNA sequencing and testing are not capable of performing their function, and thus after this week’s Court of Justice decision are ineligible for patent coverage in the European Union.

Of course, this would depend upon how one defines the "function of the patented gene. For example, one might argue that one important function of BRCA sequences claimed in Myriad’s patents is for diagnostic testing, and hence isolated DNA sequences generated in the course of genetic testing are performing a function for which they are patented

However, under a more restrictive view the function of the BRCA genetic sequences is to code for the BRCA protein product, i.e., the actual physiological function of the BRCA gene in the human body. Myriad’s patents specifically discuss use of the isolated BRCA gene for production of the BRCA protein in a recombinant cell, which could be a useful research tool in drug discovery. As discussed in earlier posts relating to the ACLU lawsuit, I point out that in practice BRCA testing does not involve the amplification of the full length BRCA coding sequence, but only amplicons representing fragments of the gene. These fragments would not be capable of achieving the function of expressing the full-length protein, and thus arguably lack the requisite functional potential.

I think reasonable minds could go either way on the issue, but given the current level of antipathy towards the use of gene patents to block genetic diagnostic testing, I can envision a European court adopting a restrictive interpretation of what it means for a genetic sequence to be capable of performing its patentable function, and decide that gene patent coverage does not extend to use of the genetic sequence in diagnostic testing.

In a related context, the Court’s decision could have implications for the effect of gene patents on whole genome sequencing. There is much buzz these days regarding the imminent arrival of personal whole genome sequencing, which will permit individuals to have their entire genome sequenced for a relatively small amount of money. Some have worried that a thicket of gene patents might impede the ability of firms to provide whole genome sequencing. However, DNA “manufactured” in the course of whole genome sequencing is unlikely to be found capable of performing the function of individual patented genetic sequences residing therein, in which case genome sequencing would not result in patent infringement liability in Europe.

I personally do not think gene patents will substantially impede whole genome sequencing, in the US or elsewhere. But if I am wrong, and patents on genes pose a substantial impediment to whole genome sequencing in the US, the patents could be circumvented by exporting the process to a place like Europe. The EU court decision could substantially reduce the likelihood that whole genome sequencing in Europe will result in liability for patent infringement.

On the other hand, the ruling should not affect the ability of biotechnology companies to use gene patents to protect their biologic drugs. In this context, the patented gene is performing its primary function of expressing the protein encoded by the gene, and thus satisfies the criterion established by Tuesdays decision of the Court of Justice.

Available link for download

Read more »